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REMEDIAL CHEVRON* 
F. ANDREW HESSICK** 
Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., courts must defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering. 
Although this deference captures the institutional advantages of 
agencies in interpreting statutes, critics—most notably Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch—have raised serious challenges to its 
legality. They have argued that Chevron violates Article III by 
constraining the interpretive power of the federal courts; rests on 
the unjustifiable assumption that Congress has delegated primary 
interpretive authority to agencies; and is inconsistent with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which directs federal courts to 
review statutes de novo. These challenges threaten to unravel 
Chevron deference, thereby losing the functional, institutional 
benefits of that deference and casting doubt on countless agency 
regulations and adjudications. 
To meet these concerns, this Article proposes restructuring 
Chevron as a limitation on the remedial power of the courts 
instead of a doctrine of interpretation. Under this approach, 
courts would not defer to agency interpretations. Instead, 
Remedial Chevron would limit the circumstances under which 
courts could vacate agency actions as inconsistent with statutes. 
Courts could vacate agency actions on that ground only if the 
agency’s interpretation was unreasonable. This approach would 
avoid the legal objections to Chevron while largely preserving 
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Judicial deference to agency interpretations is a central feature 
of administrative law. The chief form of deference derives from 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,1 in 
which the Supreme Court held that federal courts must defer to 
reasonable interpretations rendered by federal agencies of statutes 
that they administer.2 The legal justification for Chevron deference is 
that, by enacting statutes for agencies to administer, Congress 
implicitly delegates interpretive authority to agencies. Since it was 
decided in 1984, Chevron has been invoked in thousands of judicial 
decisions,3 and today it regularly underlies policy decisions made by 
Congress and agencies.4 
 
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Id. at 845. 
 3. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) (“Chevron has been cited .	.	. in roughly 15,000 judicial decisions .	.	.	.”). 
 4. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 996 (2013) (concluding based on an empirical study that Chevron 
“affects the degree of specificity [drafters] use while drafting”); Christopher J. Walker, 
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1062 (2015) [hereinafter 
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation] (concluding in an empirical study that 
ninety percent of agency drafters relied on Chevron). 
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Despite its ubiquity, Chevron rests on uneasy ground. Since its 
inception, critics have questioned the lawfulness of Chevron.5 They 
have raised three major objections.6 The first is that, as conceived at 
the Founding, the judicial power conferred by Article III on the 
federal courts includes the power to interpret statutes independently. 
As Marbury v. Madison7 put it, “It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”8 Accordingly, 
requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutes is 
unconstitutional.9 The second is that the legal justification for 
Chevron—that Congress implicitly delegates interpretive authority to 
agencies by enacting statutes for agencies to administer—is unsound 
because it rests on a fiction10 and violates the nondelegation 
doctrine.11 The third is that requiring courts to defer violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which appears to require 
courts to interpret statutes de novo.12 These originalist and textualist 
attacks on Chevron’s legality have intensified as textualism and 
originalism have become increasingly dominant.13 
 
 5. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 421, 466–69 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal] 
(arguing that Chevron undermines separation of powers). 
 6. These legal arguments are not the only objections to Chevron. Others include that 
plenary judicial review discourages agencies from interpreting statutes to promote self-
interests and prevents unconstrained agencies. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, 
and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 289, 291 (1986). This Article 
does not address these prudential arguments. 
 7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 8. Id. at 177. 
 9. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 
YALE L.J. 908, 922–25 (2017) (discussing constitutional challenges to judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes). 
 10. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2033 (2011) (“[The delegation theory] impairs the legitimacy of the 
Court’s interpretive framework because it is a fiction.”). 
 11. See Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2016) 
(“[T]o the extent executive interpretations are a form of binding lawmaking, they usurp 
the power of Congress .	.	.	.”). 
 12. See Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 813, 816–18 (2013) (arguing that section 706 of the APA precludes 
Chevron). 
 13. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 351, 363–73 (1994) (noting the increase in textualist challenges to Chevron); 
Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 24–25, 42–43 (2017) (discussing recent originalist attacks on Chevron); 
see also John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and 
Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484, 500 (2014) (discussing the increased 
“popularity of textualism and originalism”). These attacks constitute a tiny piece of the 
vast body of scholarship on Chevron. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and the 
Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457–59 (2014) [hereinafter Manning, 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
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Commentators have tended to offer three solutions to the legal 
objections to Chevron: (1) eliminate Chevron deference and require 
courts to interpret statutes de novo; (2) disregard the objections and 
preserve Chevron in its current form; or (3) take a middle path of so-
called Skidmore deference,14 under which courts have plenary 
authority to interpret statutes but must give serious consideration to 
agency interpretations.15 None of these approaches is ideal. Chevron 
deference should not be maintained if it violates the law. At the same 
time, entirely discarding obligatory deference is unpalatable because 
there are good, functional reasons for courts to defer to agency 
interpretations.16 
Agencies are more accountable to the public than courts, can 
more easily alter interpretations to respond to changes in 
circumstances, are more familiar with the broader regulatory scheme 
embodied in other statutes, can more readily establish uniform 
interpretations, and have greater expertise than judges on the 
technical and complex matters covered by regulatory statutes.17 More 
 
Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator] (discussing how the trend towards textualism and 
the wider gap between statutory language and legislative purpose are obstacles to Chevron 
deference); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron 
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1161–65 (2012) (describing 
Chevron as a doctrine of delegation instead of deference); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 205–06 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero] 
(discussing competing views of Chevron’s applicability to interpreting statutory 
ambiguities); Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 
1894 (2016) (considering recent cases that have accorded Chevron deference for 
procedural provisions); see also Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014) (noting that over 10,000 articles have discussed 
Chevron). 
 14. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that courts give 
weight to an agency interpretation commensurate with “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control”). 
 15. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
1013–14 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent] (describing 
these “three general strategies”). 
 16. Professors Vermeule and Gersen have proposed converting Chevron into a voting 
rule under which a multimember court will uphold an agency interpretation unless a 
supermajority of the judges disagree with the agency’s interpretation. Jacob E. Gersen & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 679 (2007). Although the 
motivation is to combat psychological biases that can distort the application of Chevron, 
see id. at 679–80, their proposal also would avoid some of the Article III and APA 
criticisms of Chevron. But unlike Remedial Chevron, their proposal works only for 
multimember courts. It does not provide a protocol for Chevron at the trial court level. 
 17. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 15, at 1009. 
Functional considerations formed the original motivation for Chevron deference. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
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generally, interpreting ambiguous statutes involves policy judgments; 
thus, letting courts disagree with agency interpretations threatens to 
undermine the agency’s role of setting regulatory policy.18 
This Article offers a fourth approach. It proposes refashioning 
Chevron deference as a limitation on the courts’ remedial power. 
Under this approach—which this Article calls Remedial Chevron—
courts would no longer defer to agency interpretations as they do 
under current doctrine; they would have the power to interpret laws 
de novo. Instead, courts would lack the power to vacate agency 
actions as contrary to law if they rest on reasonable interpretations of 
statutes. A court could vacate such an action only if the agency’s 
interpretation was unreasonable. In other words, Remedial Chevron 
would restructure Chevron from a doctrine empowering agencies to 
tell the courts what the law is to a doctrine restricting what courts can 
do about legal errors committed by agencies. 
Although it would narrow the instances in which deference 
applies, Remedial Chevron maintains much of the judicial deference 
to agency actions that Chevron currently requires. But it avoids 
violating Article III. Unlike interfering with a court’s ability to 
interpret the law, restricting a court’s ability to award a remedy is 
consistent with Article III, as damage caps and restrictions on the 
availability of injunctions demonstrate. Remedial Chevron also 
eliminates the need to rely on the theory that Congress implicitly 
delegates interpretive power to agencies through administrative 
statutes, because it rests on limiting the courts’ remedial power 
instead of delegating interpretive power to agencies. It also comports 
better with the APA. Under a remedial conception of Chevron, 
courts would interpret the law independently, as the APA appears to 
require.19 Remedial Chevron would simply limit the circumstances 
under which courts could provide relief in challenges to agency 
actions. That remedial limitation is easier to square with the text of 
the APA than the current Chevron doctrine. 
Remedial Chevron would also eliminate the so-called Chevron 
step zero doctrine. That doctrine holds that not all agency 
 
2580, 2587 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (discussing the pragmatic 
origins of Chevron). 
 18. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 213 (noting the argument that Chevron “favor[s] agencies over courts in 
making the policy decisions inherent in the resolution of statutory ambiguity”); Sunstein, 
Beyond Marbury, supra note 17, at 2587 (arguing that Chevron is an effort to protect 
agency policymaking). 
 19. 5 U.S.C. §	706 (2012). 
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interpretations of statutes warrant Chevron deference; instead, 
Chevron applies only when Congress delegates the power to issue 
binding interpretations and the agency employs that power when 
rendering its interpretation.20 Remedial Chevron obviates the need 
for courts to determine whether Chevron step zero is satisfied 
because it does not depend on a delegation of interpretive authority 
to the agencies but instead limits the remedial power of the courts. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes Chevron and 
the legal objections that critics have raised against it. Part II then 
turns to the proposal. It first describes how Chevron would operate as 
a remedy. It then explains how Remedial Chevron avoids violating 
Article III, eliminates the need to rely on fictional delegations of 
interpretive power, and aligns better with the APA than the current 
Chevron doctrine. Part III addresses several doctrinal consequences 
of reframing Chevron as a remedy. For example, in addition to 
eliminating Chevron step zero, Remedial Chevron would significantly 
change the effect of prior judicial interpretations of a statute. 
Currently, an agency may interpret an ambiguous statute differently 
from an interpretation of the same statute previously rendered by an 
appellate court. But under Remedial Chevron, judicial interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes would bind agencies. 
I.  THE CURRENT CHEVRON DOCTRINE AND ITS LEGAL 
SHORTCOMINGS 
A. Chevron Deference 
Chevron established a two-part test to control judicial review of 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency administers.21 
At the first step, the court must determine whether “Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”22 If it has, the court 
“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”23 But if the statute is ambiguous, the court proceeds to 
step two. At this second step, the court must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute if that interpretation is “a permissible 
construction of the statute.”24 This regime potentially permits 
multiple agency interpretations to which a court must defer, because 
 
 20. See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 13, at 187–90 (exploring the contours 
of Chevron step zero). 
 21. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 22. Id. at 842. 
 23. Id. at 843. 
 24. Id. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
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an ambiguous statute may support more than one reasonable 
interpretation.25 
Chevron deference reflects the pragmatic conclusion that 
agencies are better suited than courts to resolve ambiguities in 
statutes that they are charged with administering.26 When the tools of 
statutory interpretation run out, the resolution of ambiguity in a 
statute is no longer simply a legal question. Rather, interpreting the 
statute also calls for value-laden judgments.27 That is especially so for 
statutes that describe the objects and tools of regulation because 
whether to regulate and how to regulate depend on broad 
determinations of legislative fact and policy.28 
Agencies have various institutional advantages over courts in 
implementing policy through interpretation.29 They have expertise 
over the areas to be regulated, are better situated to coordinate 
regulations across statutory schemes, are more politically 
accountable, may have greater initiative because they are not bound 
by case and controversy restrictions, can update interpretations more 
quickly in response to changing circumstances, and can more easily 
avoid inefficiencies by adopting nationwide interpretations.30 
Although the Court invoked these institutional reasons in 
Chevron itself,31 they do not provide the current justification for the 
 
 25. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 
(2005); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 26. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (justifying deference on the ground that “[j]udges are 
not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of Government”). 
 27. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 593 (1985) (“[I]nterpretation is inherently a form of policymaking .	.	.	.”). 
 28. See id. (arguing that deference is particularly important for statutes that confer 
policymaking power); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 635 (1996) [hereinafter 
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference] (arguing that statutes that 
“create and regulate administrative agencies” are “habitually vague and indefinite” to 
afford agencies policy flexibility). 
 29. See Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 15, at 1009 
(discussing institutional advantages of agencies). 
 30. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency 
Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 749–50 (2013) (discussing these 
advantages). This is not to say that agencies are superior interpreters in all respects. Some 
have argued that because federal judges are shielded from political pressure in rendering 
their interpretations and often have more resources to consider statutes, they may be 
better at determining the “best” objective meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 15, at 1009. But others have argued that 
agencies are actually better situated than courts to determine the intent of Congress. See, 
e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 209–10 (2006). 
 31. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
8 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
doctrine.32 Instead, the Court’s justification is that statutes require 
courts to defer to agency interpretations. The theory is that, by 
enacting the statutes that agencies administer, Congress implicitly 
delegates interpretive authority to the agency.33 Under this view, a 
court enforces the law by deferring to agency interpretations, because 
the law requires the court to defer. 
B. Challenges to Chevron’s Legality 
Critics have argued Chevron deference is illegal in three major 
ways.34 First, critics argue that requiring federal courts to defer to 
interpretations rendered by nonjudicial bodies violates Article III.35 
Article III vests the judicial power in the federal courts, and one 
aspect of the judicial power is to interpret statutes independently. 
Second, the legal justification for Chevron—that Congress implicitly 
delegates interpretive authority to the agency through organic 
statutes—rests on a fiction36 and raises nondelegation concerns.37 
Third, requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations is 
 
 32. Barron & Kagan, supra note 18, at 212–14 (discussing the shift in justification of 
deference away from functional considerations). 
 33. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“We accord 
deference to agencies under Chevron .	.	. because of a presumption that Congress, when it 
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency .	.	.	.”). One reason for the 
switch in justifications is the increasing perception that although the institutional 
advantages of agencies might support judicial consideration of agency interpretations, 
these advantages are insufficient to support a universal rule that requires courts to defer to 
agency interpretations. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (arguing that expertise is not a basis for 
mandatory deference); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, supra note 5, at 
466 (“Because these [institutional] factors have different force in different contexts, the 
appropriate degree of deference cannot be resolved by a general rule.”). But in Barnhart 
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), the Court once again suggested that these institutional 
considerations underlie Chevron deference. Id. at 222 (pointing to the “expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of 
that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over 
a long period of time”). 
 34. This Article does not seek to prove that these arguments against Chevron are 
correct. Instead, its aim is to justify judicial deference even if these arguments are correct. 
 35. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 36. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (acknowledging that this argument rests on a “legal 
fiction”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 297, 305 (2017) (noting that this argument rests on a fiction). 
 37. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature 
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112–13 (2018) (recounting this nondelegation 
argument). 
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inconsistent with the APA, which requires courts to interpret statutes 
de novo.38 
1.  Article III Judicial Power 
Article III provides that the “judicial Power .	.	. shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts” that Congress 
creates.39 Some have argued—most notably Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch—that this judicial power includes the power to interpret the 
law independently.40 Thus, they argue, requiring Article III courts to 
defer to agency interpretations of the law is unconstitutional. There is 
significant support for this argument. 
Although neither Article III nor any other portion of the 
Constitution defines the “judicial power,” there was a general 
understanding of its outlines at the Founding.41 One aspect of the 
judicial power was the ability to interpret the law independently.42 For 
example, in the 1768 edition of his digest, Matthew Bacon said not 
only that “[e]very [q]uestion of [l]aw is to be tried by the Court” but 
also that “[i]t is the Province of the Justices to determine, what the 
[m]eaning of a [w]ord or [s]entence in an Act of Parliament is.”43 
Blackstone offered a similar description of the courts’ power to 
interpret the law, stating that the “judicial power” included the power 
“to determine the law arising upon [the] fact[s]” of a case.44 
The Founders adopted the same position on the judiciary’s 
power to interpret the law. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton 
 
 38. Philip Hamburger argues that applying Chevron deference in suits in which the 
government is a party also violates the Due Process Clause because it biases the outcome 
in favor of the government. Hamburger, supra note 11, at 1211–12. This argument 
questionably assumes that the procedure the agency itself has already employed is 
inadequate, and it is inconsistent with the traditional limits on mandamus, which was 
unavailable to challenge government actions based on reasonable interpretations. See 
infra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	1. 
 40. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 
834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Hamburger, supra 
note 11, at 1205 (“When a judge defers to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, he .	.	. 
violates his office or duty to exercise his own independent judgment.”). 
 41. SAMUEL MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
313 (New York, Banks & Bros. 1891) (stating that an “exact definition” cannot be found 
in “the old treatises, or any of the old English authorities”). 
 42. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 549–53 (2008) (arguing that 
courts historically exercised independent judgment in interpretation). 
 43. 5 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 217 (London, 3d ed. 
1768). 
 44. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25.  
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
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stated that “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts.”45 In other Federalist Papers, Hamilton again 
stressed the courts’ power to interpret the law when he explained why 
the Constitution did not include a council of revision to review 
proposed legislation. He explained that, because the judges “are to be 
interpreters of the law,” permitting them to serve on a council of 
revision might lead to “an improper bias from having given a previous 
opinion in their revisionary capacities.”46 Other proponents of the 
Constitution expressed similar views.47 
Opponents of the Constitution also understood the judiciary to 
have independent interpretive power. Illustrative is the objection of 
the Federal Farmer, who argued that federal judges posed more of a 
threat than Congress to liberty because of their power to interpret the 
laws.48 
Statements following the adoption of the Constitution further 
indicate that the judicial power included the power to interpret the 
law independently. For example, during a debate in the House of 
Representatives in the First Congress, Madison stated that “in the 
ordinary course of government, .	.	. the exposition of the laws and 
Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary.”49 Chief Justice Marshall 
echoed these sentiments in Marbury v. Madison when he said that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”50 
 
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  
 46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“[T]he judges, who are to be interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias 
from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities .	.	. [or] be induced to 
embark too far in the political views of [the Executive] .	.	.	.”).  
 47. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966) (statement of Rufus King) (opposing a council of revision on the 
ground that “[j]udges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before 
them”).  
 48. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (XV) (Jan. 18, 1788), 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315, 315 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“[J]udges 
and juries, in their interpretations .	.	. have a very extensive influence for preserving or 
destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the government.”).  
 49. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The statement is 
particularly revealing because Madison made it in the context of arguing for an exception 
to this rule for interpretations of constitutional provisions delineating the powers of the 
respective branches. See id. The statement was a concession that Madison sought a unique 
exception. Benjamin Kleinerman, The Madisonian Constitution: Rightly Understood, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 943, 961 (2012). 
 50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Today, although courts 
often defer to agency interpretations of statutes, courts refuse to defer to others’ 
interpretations of the Constitution. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
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Consistent with this view, many pre-Chevron Supreme Court 
decisions rejected judicial deference to interpretations rendered by 
administrative agencies.51 The most significant decision on the matter 
is Crowell v. Benson.52 There, the Court held that Congress could 
authorize nonjudicial agencies to facilitate Article III adjudications by 
making initial fact and legal determinations.53 The Court explained 
that such preliminary adjudications by these so-called judicial 
adjuncts did not violate Article III so long as the Article III courts 
retained the essential characteristics of the judicial power, one of 
which was de novo review of questions of law.54 
To be sure, not all decisions adhered to this view. A different line 
of decisions held that courts should defer to agencies’ interpretations 
of statutes that they administer.55 That line of cases directly conflicted 
with the decisions holding that courts should interpret statutes de 
novo.56 Chevron resolved this conflict by following the latter line of 
cases, holding that courts must defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations of statutes that the agency administers.57 
If the judicial power includes the power to render independent 
interpretations of laws, Chevron deference violates Article III.58 
Under Chevron, courts do not interpret statutes independently; they 
are bound by reasonable interpretations of statutes rendered by 
 
Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1488 (2010). That arrangement is a 
reversal of the past. In the nineteenth century, courts interpreted statutes de novo, see 
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 127–28 (1814), but reviewed 
constitutional interpretations deferentially, see Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 
(1810) (stating that a court may declare an act of a legislature unconstitutional only when 
“[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law [is] such that the judge feels a clear 
and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other”).  
 51. See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); 
NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960). 
 52. 485 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 53. See id. at 50. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. 
United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939). 
 56. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(describing the conflict). 
 57. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(“[F]ederal judges .	.	. have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by [the 
agency].”).  
 58. This power to interpret the law independently does not bar Congress from 
enacting a new law directing how to interpret an old law. E.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016). But agencies do not have the power to pass new laws. Their 
interpretations are implementations of existing law; even Congress cannot direct how to 
interpret an existing law without amending that law. See id. (stating Congress exceeds its 
power by “attempt[ing] to direct the result without altering the legal standards”). 
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agencies. Neither Chevron nor its predecessors deferring to agency 
interpretations explained how that deference is consistent with the 
judicial power to interpret laws independently. 
Nor do any of the theories offered to justify Chevron explain 
how it is consistent with the judicial power. None claims to reinterpret 
the judicial power in a way that permits judicial deference to 
nonjudicial interpretations, nor does any provide a reason to think 
that courts exercise something other than the judicial power when 
they defer to agency interpretations. Instead, those theories only 
provide reasons for requiring judicial deference to agency 
interpretations, assuming that such deference is constitutionally 
permissible. 
2.  Delegations of Interpretive Power 
A second set of objections to Chevron challenges the legal 
justification for Chevron—that, by enacting various statutes for 
agencies to administer, Congress implicitly delegates interpretive 
authority to an agency. This theory faces two criticisms. First, it rests 
on a fiction.59 As has long been suspected and as recent studies 
confirm, for most statutes delegating power to agencies, members of 
Congress do not give any thought to whether the statute confers 
interpretive authority on the agency that administers the statute.60 
Second, some have argued that this delegation theory raises 
nondelegation concerns. Article I vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative 
[p]owers.”61 That legislative power cannot be delegated.62 According 
to some, the delegation theory underlying Chevron violates this 
restriction because it results in Congress delegating lawmaking power 
to federal agencies.63 
 
 59. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 10, at 2033 (arguing the delegation theory “impairs 
the legitimacy of the Court’s interpretive framework because it is a fiction”); Breyer, supra 
note 36, at 370 (acknowledging this argument rests on a “legal fiction”). 
 60. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 996–97 (reporting from an empirical study on 
Congress that “decisions to leave statutory terms ambiguous are typically made without 
regard to whether the courts will later defer to an agency interpretation”); Scalia, supra 
note 33, at 517 (“In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress .	.	. didn’t think about 
the matter at all.”). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	1. 
 62. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[Article I] permits 
no delegation of those powers .	.	.	.”). 
 63. See Hamburger, supra note 11, at 1198 (“[T]o the extent executive interpretations 
are a form of binding lawmaking, they usurp the power of Congress .	.	.	.”); Ilan Wurman, 
As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 990 (2018) (describing nondelegation 
objections to Chevron); see also Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 
2017) (Jordan, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron results in courts “largely ‘abdicat[ing] 
[their] duty to enforce [the] prohibition’ against Congressional delegation of legislative 
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3.  Inconsistency with the APA 
The third legal objection to Chevron deference is that it conflicts 
with section 706 of the APA. That section controls judicial review of 
agency action. It provides that a “reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions.”64 By requiring courts “to interpret statutes,” section 706 
suggests that courts should not defer to agency interpretations;65 
instead, courts should interpret statutes independently.66 
To reconcile Chevron with section 706,67 commentators have 
argued that, if a statute delegates to an agency the discretion to 
choose among reasonable interpretations of that statute, a reviewing 
court properly “interpret[s]” that statute by determining only whether 
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.68 But this argument rests on 
the fiction identified earlier.69 Most administrative statutes do not 
signify a decision to confer interpretive authority.70 Moreover, even 
when Congress does mean to delegate interpretive authority to an 
agency, it rarely does so explicitly; instead, courts have held that 
agencies’ interpretive authority is implicitly conferred in statutes that 
 
power to executive agencies” (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 
1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring))). This objection applies more sensibly to 
agency rulemaking, which is legislative in nature, than to adjudication, which entails the 
exercise of a judicial power. 
 64. 5 U.S.C. §	706 (2012). 
 65. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 473 n.85 (1989) (“That section 706 appears 
to contemplate de novo judicial determination of questions of statutory meaning is 
generally acknowledged.”). 
 66. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 15, at 995 (stating 
that section 706 of the APA “suggests that Congress contemplated courts would always 
apply independent judgment on questions of law”); Metzger, supra note 13, at 38 (arguing 
that Chevron stands in tension with the APA’s instruction that courts “shall decide all 
relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions”). 
 67. Most commentators who have acknowledged the tension between Chevron 
deference and section 706 have not sought to resolve the conflict. Instead, they have 
offered reasons for Chevron deference despite section 706. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, 
at 822 (discussing commentators’ focus on justifying Chevron despite section 706). 
 68. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 36, at 303–04 (stating that section 706’s 
directive that “the court shall ‘interpret’ questions of law is not decisive in favor of 
independent judicial review, if it is also the case that under organic statutes, the correct 
interpretation of law depends on the agency’s interpretation of law” (emphasis omitted)); 
Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, supra note 13, at 459 (“[W]here 
Congress has delegated to the agency rather than the reviewing court the discretion to 
choose among reasonably available interpretations .	.	.	, the reviewing court fulfills its duty 
to ‘interpret’ the statute by determining whether the agency has stayed within the bounds 
of its assigned discretion.”). 
 69. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 70. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
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the agency is charged with administering.71 But that conclusion is 
inconsistent with section 559 of the APA, which states that another 
statute may not be held to supersede or modify the requirements of 
the APA “except to the extent that it does so expressly.”72 
II.  REMEDIAL CHEVRON 
Despite its legal shortcomings, Chevron deference serves useful 
purposes. Interpretations of ambiguous regulatory statutes involve 
policy judgments on technical matters, and agencies are better suited 
than courts to make those judgments.73 Moreover, overturning 
Chevron would jeopardize countless agency regulations, many of 
which regulators promulgated in reliance on Chevron.74 It would also 
undermine congressional expectations in drafting statutes. As recent 
research reveals, although Congress does not intentionally delegate 
interpretive power to agencies, it does often operate on the 
assumption that agencies will play a significant role in resolving 
ambiguities.75 These considerations counsel against discarding 
Chevron wholesale based on legal concerns. They suggest instead that 
Chevron should be modified to minimize these objections. 
One approach is to refashion Chevron as a remedial doctrine.76 
Under this approach, courts would not defer to agency interpretations 
of the law. Instead, Remedial Chevron would limit the circumstances 
under which a court could vacate an agency action on the ground that 
it is based on an erroneous interpretation of a statute. A court could 
vacate such an agency action only if the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute is unreasonable. This approach would satisfy both pragmatic 
reasons for Chevron and also avoid the formalist objections to it. 
Remedial Chevron would preserve the courts’ judicial power to 
interpret the law while functionally requiring judicial deference to 
agency interpretations in challenges to agency actions. 
 
 71. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, supra note 13, at 459 
(“[O]rganic acts often delegate interpretive discretion without specifying explicitly to 
which institution the delegation runs .	.	.	.”). 
 72. 5 U.S.C. §	559 (2012). 
 73. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.  
 74. See Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, supra note 4, at 1061–62 
(concluding in an empirical study that ninety percent of agency drafters rely on Chevron). 
 75. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 4, at 996 (concluding based on an empirical study 
that Chevron “affects the degree of specificity [drafters] use while drafting” but this 
assumption does not reflect an intent to delegate interpretive authority to agencies). 
 76. A remedy is the relief awarded by a court, such as damages or an injunction. 
Vacating an administrative action is a type of remedy. Remedial Chevron limits the 
circumstances under which a court can award that remedy.  
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A. Distinguishing Remedial Chevron from Current Chevron 
To understand how Remedial Chevron differs from the current 
Chevron doctrine, it may be useful to begin with an overview of 
remedies. Remedies are the means by which courts vindicate rights.77 
Examples of remedies include damages, injunctions, and declaratory 
judgments. Remedies are awarded after a court has determined that a 
violation of substantive law that forms the basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim has occurred. 
Although remedies are awarded only after a court determines 
that a substantive violation has occurred, not all violations of rights 
entitle individuals to remedies. To the contrary, the law routinely 
limits the remedies available to plaintiffs who demonstrate that they 
have been, or are about to be, wronged.78 
Injunctions provide an example. To obtain an injunction, a 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant has violated, or is on the 
verge of violating, the plaintiff’s rights. But that showing is not 
sufficient by itself. The plaintiff must also establish that he will suffer 
irreparable harm if the court does not grant an injunction, that the 
costs of an injunction do not substantially outweigh the benefits, and 
that the injunction is in the public interest.79 If a plaintiff does not 
make these additional showings, a court cannot award an injunction, 
even if the plaintiff’s rights will be violated without one.80 
The law also imposes limits on damages. For example, the victim 
of a tort is not necessarily entitled to all the damages required to 
compensate him for the injuries he has suffered.81 Some laws impose 
 
 77. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (“[A] remedy is the 
means employed to enforce a right.”). 
 78. See JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, LITERARY, CRITICAL, 
JURIDICAL, AND POLITICAL OF JOSEPH STORY 281 (Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1835) 
(“There are many cases, in which the parties are without remedy at law, or in which the 
remedy is wholly inadequate to the attainment of justice.”). 
 79. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). This is the default 
standard. Congress has altered the requirements for some injunctions. See, e.g., Tenn. 
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–95 (1978). 
 80. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392. 
 81. See 3 DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, 
EQUITY, RESTITUTION 4 (3d ed. 2018) (stating that “the aim of damages is compensation 
for the plaintiff’s loss” caused by violations of rights). 
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caps on damages.82 Others prohibit recovery of damages for certain 
types of injuries, such as economic83 or emotional harms.84 
Even violations of constitutional rights often do not have a 
remedy. For example, a person cannot automatically obtain damages 
for a constitutional violation at the hands of a federal official. Courts 
will create a Bivens-type damages remedy85 only if there are no 
special factors counseling hesitation.86 If creating a damages remedy 
threatens overdeterring federal officials or would impose undue costs 
on the government, a court will not authorize the damages award.87 
Remedial Chevron is a limitation on the remedial power of this 
sort. Remedial Chevron limits the circumstances under which a court 
can grant the remedy of vacating an agency action. In a challenge 
alleging that an agency action rests on an erroneous interpretation of 
a statute, a court can vacate an agency action only if the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. 
Remedial Chevron thus markedly differs from the current 
Chevron doctrine. The current doctrine is not a remedial doctrine. 
Instead, it focuses on substantive law. It requires that, in determining 
the meaning of substantive statutes that form the basis for claims, 
courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of those statutes. 
The focus is on what the statute means, not on whether the court has 
the power to vacate an agency action. 
 
 82. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §	1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (capping class action damages under 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s 
net worth); id. §	1640(a)(2)(B) (capping Truth in Lending damages in class actions at the 
lesser of $1,000,000 or 1% of the creditor’s net worth). 
 83. E.g., Glob. Quest, LLC v. Horizon Yachts, Inc., 849 F.3d 1022, 1030 (11th Cir. 
2017) (discussing the “economic loss rule” limiting recovery for economic harms in 
negligence actions). 
 84. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 304 (2012) (holding that violations of the 
Privacy Act permit recovery of damages for pecuniary losses, but not for emotional, 
reputational, or other nonpecuniary harms). 
 85. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), the Court created a damages action against federal officers who violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 389. Courts have extended Bivens to violations of various other 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980); Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245–47 (1979). 
 86. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“[A] Bivens remedy will not be 
available if there are ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative 
action by Congress.’” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396)). 
 87. See id. at 1858 (considering “the burdens on Government employees who are sued 
personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government” in 
deciding whether to recognize a Bivens action). 
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B. Consistency with the Judicial Power 
Remedial Chevron avoids violating the judicial power of Article 
III. Under this approach, courts would have plenary authority to 
determine the meaning of statutes. They would not be obliged to 
defer to agency interpretations of statutes. Instead, Remedial 
Chevron would simply limit the circumstances under which a court 
could grant the remedy of vacating an agency’s action. 
Crafting remedies is the job of Congress.88 That is because 
determining what remedies should be available to vindicate rights 
involves a variety of policy determinations. Remedies do not simply 
vindicate rights. They also incentivize behaviors by imposing costs on 
those who may have to pay those remedies, and they create 
transaction costs for litigants and the judicial system.89 Congress 
accordingly has broad authority to regulate the relief for the 
violations of rights. Congress can impose caps on damages, restrict 
the availability of injunctions, and even refuse to create a cause of 
action to vindicate a right.90 
Restricting the availability of a remedy does not interfere with 
the judicial power. It does not direct courts on how to interpret the 
law, what facts to find, or how to apply the law to the facts.91 The 
restriction dictates only when relief is available under the law when a 
court determines that a legal violation has occurred.92 
Remedial Chevron is simply a restriction on the courts’ remedial 
power. It limits a reviewing court’s ability to award the remedy of 
overturning an agency’s action based on an erroneous interpretation 
to instances where the interpretation is unreasonable. 
 
 88. Switchmen’s Union of N. Am. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) 
(“[I]t is for Congress to determine how the rights which it creates shall be enforced.”). Of 
course, Congress must comply with the Constitution in framing remedies. 
 89. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. 
 90. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366 (1953) (“Congress 
necessarily has a wide choice in the selection of remedies .	.	.	.”). 
 91. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60–65 (1932) (identifying these characteristics 
as the features of the judicial power); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *25 
(defining “judicial power” as the power “to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the 
law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by 
[its] officers to apply the remedy”). 
 92. To be sure, courts have the power to fashion common law remedies when 
Congress has not acted. But that power is to fill gaps in the law that Congress has not yet 
addressed. Congress has the power to overturn common law determinations by statute. 
Once Congress has determined the remedy to vindicate legal rights, the courts ordinarily 
cannot provide a different one. See Switchmen’s Union, 320 U.S. at 301 (“[T]he 
specification of one remedy [by Congress] normally excludes another.”). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
18 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
This type of remedial limitation—a limitation on the judiciary’s 
ability to award a remedy based on the reasonableness of another’s 
interpretation of the law—is common in the law. For example, under 
the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials who violate a 
person’s constitutional rights are immune from damages if the 
constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the 
violation.93 Qualified immunity limits the remedy based on the 
officer’s interpretation of the law. It assumes that a plaintiff’s right 
was violated but precludes the remedy of damages for that violation if 
a reasonable official could have thought his actions were legal.94 
The law governing federal habeas corpus relief for state court 
convictions follows a similar scheme. The violation of a constitutional 
right in a state criminal proceeding does not entitle the person 
convicted in that proceeding to federal habeas relief. Instead, federal 
law limits the availability of the remedy of habeas corpus to instances 
where the state court’s decision turns on an unreasonable application 
of clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme Court.95 
Remedial Chevron accordingly does not impair the judicial 
power. 
C. Avoiding the Delegation Objections 
Remedial Chevron also avoids the objections to the delegation 
theory of Chevron.96 Remedial Chevron does not depend on the 
theory that Congress has delegated to agencies the authority to 
render binding interpretations of statutes. Instead, the theory 
underlying Remedial Chevron is that the remedial power of the 
courts to overturn agency actions has been restricted. It accordingly 
does not require courts to adopt the fiction that Congress delegates 
interpretive authority,97 nor does it raise the concern that Congress 
 
 93. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (“Qualified immunity 
attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. 28 U.S.C. §	2254(d)(1) (2012). 
 96. For objections to the delegation theory of Chevron, see supra Section I.B.2. 
 97. One might argue that these delegations are no longer fictions because Congress 
has acquiesced by not legislating to overturn Chevron. But one cannot put much stock in 
acquiescence by silence. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, 
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 554–56 (1992) (arguing that “Congress’s failure to 
object” often “means virtually nothing”). That is particularly so for Chevron deference 
because the Court has not consistently applied Chevron to agency interpretations. See 
infra Section III.B. This inconsistency creates additional uncertainty about how to 
interpret congressional silence. Moreover, Chevron does not rest on the interpretation of a 
single statute. Chevron depends on the fiction that Congress delegates interpretive 
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impermissibly delegates its legislative authority by authorizing 
agencies to render binding interpretations. 
D. Better Consistency with the APA 
Remedial Chevron also aligns better than the current doctrine 
with section 706 of the APA. The current doctrine conflicts with two 
provisions of section 706: the preamble in section 706 and section 
706(2)(A). Remedial Chevron avoids one of these conflicts entirely, 
and there is a much better case that Remedial Chevron avoids the 
conflict with the other provision than there is for the current Chevron 
doctrine. In other words, Remedial Chevron presents at most one of 
the two inconsistencies with the APA that the current doctrine does. 
Unlike the current Chevron doctrine, Remedial Chevron does 
not violate section 706’s preamble. That preamble requires 
“reviewing court[s]” to “decide all relevant questions of law” and to 
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”98 Remedial 
Chevron does not require courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes but instead limits the remedial power of the courts. 
The current Chevron doctrine also conflicts with section 
706(2)(A), which requires courts to “set aside” agency actions that 
are “not in accordance with law.”99 Under the current doctrine, a 
court cannot vacate an agency action based on its disagreement with 
the agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers if the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable. One might argue that Remedial Chevron 
also conflicts with this provision because it prevents courts from 
setting aside agency actions that rest on interpretations of the law that 
conflict with the courts’ interpretation of that law if that agency 
interpretation is reasonable.100 It results in courts upholding agency 
actions that they think are not in accordance with the law. 
 
authority to agencies in each organic statute. Thus, Chevron would no longer rest on a 
fiction only if Congress acquiesced in every statute involving Chevron deference. 
 98. 5 U.S.C. §	706 (2012). 
 99. Id. §	706(2)(A) (requiring courts to vacate agency actions that are “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). The various 
organic statutes specific to agencies contain similar language relating to judicial review. 
See, e.g., id. §	7703(c) (authorizing the Federal Circuit to “hold unlawful and set aside” any 
action of the Merit Systems Protection Board that is “not in accordance with law”). 
 100. See Euken v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 34 F.3d 1045, 1047 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (describing a “not in accordance with the law” standard as requiring “de novo” 
review). Section 706(2)(A)’s directive that courts vacate actions that are an “abuse of 
discretion” supports this conclusion, because abuse of discretion review entails de novo 
review of legal questions. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 448 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a familiar, if somewhat circular, maxim that deems an 
error of law an abuse of discretion.”). 
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But the conflict between Remedial Chevron and section 
706(2)(A) is not as clear as it initially appears. Categorical statutes 
like section 706(2)(A) are frequently read to include implicit 
limitations.101 For example, courts regularly interpret statutes 
addressing an issue previously governed by the common law to retain 
the substance of the common law.102 Two strands of law support 
reading section 706(2)(A) to limit the power of courts to overturn 
agency actions based on legal errors. 
The first derives from the historical limitations on the courts’ 
power to vacate agency actions. Historically, the principal way by 
which courts reviewed executive actions was through a writ of 
mandamus.103 This writ requires an official to take an action required 
by law. But that writ carried a deferential standard of review. Courts 
could enter mandamus against an official only if the law plainly 
required the official to take that action. If the official’s inaction rested 
on a plausible interpretation of the law, mandamus would not lie.104 
For example, in Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie,105 the 
Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of 
the Interior directing him to disburse funds to individuals claiming to 
be members of an Indian tribe.106 The Court explained that the 
Secretary’s decision not to pay those individuals involved “questions 
of law, the solution of which requires a construction of [various] acts,” 
and that “the construction of the acts .	.	. is sufficiently uncertain” that 
 
 101. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 50 
(2018) (“Legal texts that seem categorical on their faces are frequently .	.	. subject to 
implicit exceptions	.	.	.	.”); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (2017) (discussing the theory underlying this phenomenon). 
 102. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“‘[W]hen a statute 
covers an issue previously governed by the common law,’ we must presume that ‘Congress 
intended to retain the substance of the common law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010))); Baude, supra note 101, at 50 
(“[L]egal provisions are often subject to defenses derived from common law.”). 
 103. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 166, 176–77 
(1965). Review could also be obtained through a writ of certiorari. Id. at 166. The principal 
distinction between certiorari and mandamus lies in the formality of the agency action 
under review: certiorari was appropriate for formal actions on the record, while 
mandamus extended to more informal proceedings. Id. at 177. As with mandamus, a court 
would not issue a writ of certiorari based on “mere” error of law. Id. at 167. 
 104. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 515 (1840) (refusing to grant mandamus 
against an official who “must exercise his judgment in expounding the laws and resolutions 
of Congress” when “the law authorized him to exercise discretion, or judgment”). 
 105. 281 U.S. 206 (1930). 
 106. Id. at 222. 
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it left “discretion” to the Secretary.107 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded, “[T]he case is not one in which mandamus will lie.”108 
This deferential standard in mandamus did not reflect judicial 
deference to the official’s interpretation. Rather, it was a limitation 
on the court’s ability to provide the remedy of mandamus.109 
Mandamus thus did not oblige courts to defer to another official’s 
interpretation; instead, it restricted the circumstances under which 
courts could provide mandamus.110 This historical backdrop supports 
reading section 706 to limit courts’ ability to vacate agency actions. 
The second strand of law supporting deferential review of agency 
action is the law relating to collateral review. Although it is often 
treated like an appeal, a challenge to “set aside” an agency action is 
not “a mere appeal.”111 Agencies are outside the judicial branch. A 
challenge is accordingly “a new proceeding” more akin to a collateral 
attack.112 The law has long imposed higher standards in reviewing 
judgments on collateral attack than on appeals. For example, not all 
errors of law are a basis for a collateral attack; only if the error 
resulted in a “miscarriage of justice” can the judgment be set aside.113 
The reasons for this reluctance to set aside judgments are to promote 
comity114 and to avoid upsetting settled expectations and the costs of 
unnecessary litigation.115 
Similar logic applies to judicial review of agency actions. Judicial 
second-guessing leads to uncertainty about the validity of agency 
actions and, accordingly, discourages individuals from relying on 
 
 107. Id. at 221. 
 108. Id. at 222. 
 109. See Bamzai, supra note 9, at 951–52. 
 110. Id.; see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 515 (1840) (stating that, if the Court 
could exercise mandamus jurisdiction, it “certainly would not be bound to adopt the 
construction given by the head of a department”). For this reason, Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), stating that the restrictive mandamus 
standard justified Chevron deference, is unsound. Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 111. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894). 
 112. Id. One might think that use of the term “set aside,” in contradistinction to 
“vacate,” implies collateral review. To “vacate” means to nullify or make void, Vacate, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), while to “set aside” means not to destroy but 
to preserve and disregard, see Set Aside, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). But 
the law has not carefully distinguished between “set aside” and “vacate.” See, e.g., HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS INCLUDING THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA §	297, at 372 (1891) (using “set aside” and “vacate” 
interchangeably).  
 113. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §	86 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 115. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 112, §	245, at 299 (stating that broad collateral attacks 
would lead to “no end to litigation and no fixed established rights”).  
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
22 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
those actions.116 It also imposes unwarranted costs on the 
development of policy. The role of agencies is to implement policy 
through rulemaking and other agency actions. Interpretation of 
statutes is one step in the process to implement those policies, and 
agencies are better suited to make those determinations. Moreover, 
agencies may be more concerned about adopting interpretations with 
which the courts agree than about fulfilling their task of making 
optimal policy judgments—and even then, agencies may inaccurately 
predict how a court will interpret the statute.117 Judicial review of 
agency action also poses acute comity concerns because of separation 
of powers. Instead of one part of the judiciary reviewing the work of 
another part of the judiciary, as in a usual collateral attack, challenges 
to agency action require the judiciary to review the work of another 
branch of government. Indeed, invoking precisely these 
considerations, in a pre-APA decision the Supreme Court stated that 
courts should be extremely reluctant to overturn agency 
determinations.118 
These two historical strands provide some basis for interpreting 
section 706(2)(A) to limit the courts’ remedial power—especially if 
one accepts the argument made by some that the APA sought to 
embrace common law flexibility instead of providing “firm 
expressions of legislative direction.”119 Still, it is admittedly far from 
the most natural reading.120 Nevertheless, Remedial Chevron 
comports better with the APA than the current doctrine. The current 
doctrine conflicts with two provisions of section 706. Remedial 
 
 116. Joseph W. Mead & Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court to Review the 
Executive, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (“Judicial review adds a level of unpredictability 
and uncertainty about the validity of agency action, which undermines reliance by all 
interested parties.”). 
 117. VERMEULE, supra note 30, at 210 (stating that it is “difficult” for agencies “to 
predict what the eventual fate of an agency interpretation will be”). 
 118. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894) (imposing a heightened standard of 
review for assessing agency determination). 
 119. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference, supra note 28, at 635–
36. 
 120. One might argue that prohibiting courts from vacating agency action based on 
erroneous but reasonable interpretations violates the APA’s directive that courts “shall” 
set aside actions that violate section 706. 5 U.S.C. §	706 (2012). But this objection 
misconstrues the argument. Under Remedial Chevron, courts would be required to set 
aside actions that violate section 706. Remedial Chevron refines what violates section 706 
to include only unreasonable, not merely erroneous, interpretations. In any event, one can 
plausibly argue that, because vacaturs of agency actions are similar to injunctions, courts 
should have discretion not to set aside all unlawful agency actions, just as they have 
discretion to withhold equitable relief. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial 
Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 292 (2003) 
(constructing such an argument to justify remands without vacaturs). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
2018] REMEDIAL CHEVRON 23 
Chevron entirely avoids one of these conflicts and aligns better with 
the other one than the current Chevron doctrine. 
III.  IMPLEMENTING REMEDIAL CHEVRON 
Remedial Chevron would largely retain the basic structure of the 
current Chevron doctrine. Courts would ask whether a statute is 
unambiguous and, if not, whether the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute is reasonable. But the reason for the inquiry would be 
different. Courts would not follow these two steps to determine 
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute. Instead, 
courts would ask whether the interpretation is reasonable only to 
determine whether to uphold the agency rulemaking, adjudication, or 
other action subject to judicial review. Still, converting Chevron to a 
remedial doctrine would result in some substantial changes to how 
Chevron operates. This part discusses three of those changes. 
A. Suits that Do Not Challenge Agency Action 
The first significant change is that Remedial Chevron would 
narrow the situations in which Chevron applies. Currently, when an 
agency interpretation warrants Chevron deference, courts afford that 
deference in all suits, including suits that do not seek to vacate an 
agency action. For example, if a suit between two private individuals 
turns on a statute that an agency has interpreted, courts will afford 
Chevron deference to that interpretation.121 Under Remedial 
Chevron, courts would consider the reasonableness of an agency 
interpretation only when adjudicating challenges to that agency’s 
action—such as an adjudication or rulemaking. But courts would not 
be bound by agency interpretations in suits that do not challenge 
agency actions (though they could still give some weight to the 
interpretation under Skidmore).122 
To understand the significance of the doctrinal difference, 
consider the following. A federal statute requires the Department of 
Transportation to regulate “vehicles.” Interpreting the term “vehicle” 
to include bicycles, the Department promulgates a regulation 
requiring bicycles to be registered. Two lawsuits are filed. The first is 
 
 121. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (“Under the 
familiar Chevron framework, we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a 
statute it is charged with administering.”). 
 122. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that courts should 
consider an agency interpretation based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”). 
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a suit brought by Paul against the Department, arguing that the 
regulation is unlawful because “vehicles” do not include bicycles. The 
second is a suit by Sam against Dan, arguing that Dan violated the 
federal regulation by failing to register his bicycle. 
Under current law, Chevron deference would apply in both suits. 
In both cases, the court would ask whether the interpretation is 
reasonable. If so, it would defer to the Department’s interpretation in 
assessing whether the regulation is lawful, and it would defer to the 
interpretation in determining whether Dan’s conduct was illegal. 
Things would be different under Remedial Chevron, because 
Remedial Chevron does not require courts to defer to agency 
interpretations but instead limits the circumstances under which a 
court can vacate an agency action. Thus, because the first case seeks 
to vacate a regulation, Remedial Chevron would apply, and the court 
would lack the power to vacate the regulation if it concluded that the 
interpretation of “vehicle” was reasonable. By contrast, Remedial 
Chevron would not apply to Sam’s suit against Dan, because the 
lawsuit does not seek to vacate an agency action. 
B. Chevron Step Zero 
A second consequence of reframing Chevron as a remedy is that 
it would eliminate Chevron step zero. Chevron step zero limits the 
agency interpretations that receive Chevron deference. In particular, 
Chevron applies only when Congress delegates authority to the 
agency to make interpretations carrying the force of law and the 
interpretation is the product of that power.123 Accordingly, Chevron 
deference does not extend to an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
that it is not charged with administering124 because, under current law, 
an agency’s authority to interpret a statute implicitly derives from its 
power to administer the statute.125 Nor, as the Court stressed in 
 
 123. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (stating that Chevron 
applies only when the interpretation is rendered based on “delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin 
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001) (exploring the contours 
of Chevron step zero). 
 124. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 138 n.9 (1997) (stating that 
Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations of the APA because “the APA is not a 
statute that the [agency] is charged with administering”); Dep’t of Treasury v. FLRA, 837 
F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen an agency interprets a statute other than that 
which it has been entrusted to administer, its interpretation is not entitled to [Chevron] 
deference.”). 
 125. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“We accord .	.	. 
[Chevron deference] because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a 
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United States v. Mead Corp.126 and Christensen v. Harris County,127 
does an agency receive Chevron deference when it interprets a statute 
through a procedure that does not produce rules carrying the force of 
law—such as when an agency issues an interpretation in an informal 
opinion letter that lacks the force of law.128 Instead, those 
interpretations receive only the lesser Skidmore deference, which is 
not binding.129 
Applying Chevron step zero has proven difficult.130 Although it is 
often easy to determine whether a statutory provision that an agency 
has interpreted is one that the agency is charged with administering,131 
these are not the only interpretations that fail Chevron step zero. For 
example, the Court has refused to extend Chevron deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes that they are charged with 
administering if those interpretations involve issues of broad 
“economic and political significance.”132 Thus, in King v. Burwell133 
the Court refused to defer to the IRS’s interpretation of the 
Affordable Care Act’s provision authorizing federal subsidies for 
insurance purchased on health care exchanges “established by the 
State[s]” to permit subsidies for insurance purchased on an exchange 
established by the federal government.134 Although the IRS was 
charged with administering the statute, the Court stated that because 
the subsidies involve “billions of dollars in spending each year and 
affect the price of health insurance for millions of people,” Congress 
“surely” would have “expressly” assigned interpretation of that 
provision to the IRS had it meant to do so.135 But it is entirely unclear 
 
statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency .	.	.	.”). 
 126. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 127. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 128. Id. at 587. 
 129. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that 
an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form .	.	.	.”). 
 130. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 123, at 849–52 (identifying fourteen unanswered 
questions about Chevron step zero). 
 131. This is often true, but not always. For example, justices have disagreed about 
whether agencies are charged with administering their own jurisdictional statutes. 
Compare City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–301 (2013) (holding that the agency 
is charged with administering such a statute), with id. at 319–24 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 132. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
 133. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 134. Id. at 2489. 
 135. Id.; see also Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (refusing to extend Chevron 
deference to the FDA’s interpretation of “drugs” under the Food and Drug and Cosmetic 
Act to include tobacco under the major questions doctrine). 
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which interpretations raise sufficiently major economic and political 
concerns to preclude Chevron deference.136 
Determining whether an agency’s interpretation is the product of 
a procedure that has the force of law has also proved difficult to 
resolve. Some agency actions—such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and formal adjudication—clearly have the force of law. 
But the Court has explicitly said that those actions are not the only 
ones that trigger Chevron deference.137 Yet the Court has given little 
guidance in determining which agency actions carry the force of law. 
It has suggested only that courts should look to the formality of the 
procedures that the agency employed.138 These uncertainties 
surrounding Chevron step zero have generated substantial confusion 
in the lower courts139 and have even led some courts to seek ways to 
decide cases in ways that avoid Chevron altogether.140 
Remedial Chevron would obviate Chevron step zero. Courts 
would no longer have to resolve whether agencies have the authority 
to issue binding interpretations of statutes, because remedial Chevron 
does not rest on the theory that Congress has delegated interpretive 
power to the agencies. Instead, it rests on the idea that the APA 
restricts a reviewing court’s ability to vacate an agency’s action as 
contrary to law. A court may do so only if the agency acted based on 
an unreasonable construction of the law. That limit on courts’ 
remedial power is not limited to statutes that the agency is charged 
with administering. It applies to an agency’s interpretations of all laws 
that underlie its action. This includes interpretations of statutes that 
the agency is not charged with administering. For example, if an EPA 
rulemaking rests on a reasonable interpretation of a statute that the 
Secretary of the Interior is charged with administering, a reviewing 
 
 136. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 13, at 194 (“Major questions are not 
easily distinguished from less major ones .	.	.	.”). 
 137. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002) (“[T]hat the Agency previously 
reached its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ 
rulemaking does not automatically deprive that interpretation of [Chevron] deference 
.	.	.	.” (citation omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. §	553 (2012))). 
 138. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume 
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it 
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure .	.	.	.”). 
 139. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the 
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003) (concluding that Chevron step zero has 
“sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man’s land”). 
 140. Daniel S. Brookins, Confusion in the Circuit Courts: How the Circuit Courts Are 
Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1484, 1486 
(2017); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 
1127–29 (2009) (documenting Chevron avoidance). 
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court should not overturn that rule as inconsistent with the statute. It 
likewise includes interpretations of statutory provisions of major 
economic and political significance.141 Thus, a court should not 
overturn a rule authorizing the regulation of alcohol based on a 
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statutory provision 
authorizing the regulation of “beverages.”142 
Nor would courts be required to consider the procedure through 
which an agency arrived at its interpretation. Because courts do not 
defer to agency interpretations, it is irrelevant whether an 
interpretation was the result of a procedure carrying the force of law. 
Instead, the question under Remedial Chevron is whether the agency 
relied on an unreasonable interpretation of the law in taking that 
action.143 
Applying Remedial Chevron to Mead illustrates the difference in 
the inquiries. There, Mead Corp. challenged a classification ruling by 
the Customs Service classifying day planners as bound notebooks.144 
The Court refused to extend Chevron deference to the interpretation, 
concluding classification rulings were insufficiently lawlike.145 
Remedial Chevron would lead to a different result. Because the suit 
challenged an agency action, a court would be prohibited from 
overturning the ruling if the interpretation was reasonable.146 
 
 141. Some have argued that the Court’s refusal to afford Chevron deference to statutes 
raising major economic and political questions is a doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 
See Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 19, 60–61 (2010); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of 
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 260. The theory is that, even if the nondelegation 
doctrine does not prohibit all delegations of interpretive authority to agencies, it could 
well prohibit delegations of that authority for questions that have a significant effect on 
society. But these concerns do not apply to Remedial Chevron because it does not confer 
interpretive authority on agencies but instead simply limits the remedial power of the 
courts. 
 142. Of course, a court could vacate the agency action if it concluded that the term 
“beverage” unambiguously excluded alcohol. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (concluding that Congress unambiguously excluded 
tobacco from “drugs” in the Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act). 
 143. This is not to say that an agency should be able to support its action by pressing an 
interpretation for the first time before the court. To avoid being deemed arbitrary and 
capricious, agency actions must be reasonable for the reasons that they were taken instead 
of based on “post hoc rationalizations.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). Nor is it to say that agencies should be able to adopt 
their interpretations through an unreasonable process. See TNA Merch. Projects, Inc. v. 
FERC, 616 F.3d 588, 591–93 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding agency action arbitrary and 
capricious because it did not explain its interpretation). 
 144. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 224–25 (2001). 
 145. Id. at 231. 
 146. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the Supreme Court refused 
to defer to an interpretation rendered in an opinion letter because the letter “lack[ed] the 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
28 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
This approach not only avoids Chevron step zero questions but 
also clearly delineates the line between Skidmore and Chevron.147 
Under Remedial Chevron, Skidmore would apply whenever a court is 
deciding whether to defer to an agency interpretation. Chevron would 
describe limitations on the court’s power to vacate an agency action. 
C. The Effect of Judicial Precedent 
A third change is that, if a court interprets an ambiguous statute, 
an agency could not adopt an interpretation contrary to that 
interpretation. That change would be a significant departure from 
current law. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Services,148 the Supreme Court held that if a court 
interprets a statute that an agency is charged with administering but 
that it has not yet interpreted, the agency is bound by the court’s 
interpretation only if the court rendering that earlier interpretation 
holds the statute to be unambiguous.149 By contrast, if the court holds 
that its interpretation is merely the best reading of an ambiguous 
statute, the agency may subsequently adopt a different interpretation, 
and courts are required to defer to that new agency interpretation so 
long as it is reasonable.150 This doctrine rests on the theory that 
statutes confer primary interpretive authority on agencies, not courts, 
and agencies therefore are not bound by interpretations rendered by 
a court, unless the court held the statute unambiguous.151 
Remedial Chevron does not depend on the theory that agencies 
have primary interpretive authority. It accepts the premise that the 
judicial power includes the power to interpret statutes. Accordingly, 
Brand X would no longer apply. If a court interprets a statute that an 
agency has not yet interpreted, that interpretation is the law, and an 
agency cannot adopt an interpretation that conflicts with the court’s 
(though the agency could adopt any other interpretation that is 
consistent with the court’s). More generally, anytime a court renders 
an interpretation of a statute as part of its holding, that interpretation 
becomes law that binds agencies. A consequence of this change is that 
 
force of law.” Id. at 587. Applying Remedial Chevron would lead to the same result, 
because Christenson did not involve a challenge to an agency action but was a suit 
between state officials. 
 147. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 1146 (describing the confusion between Chevron and 
Skidmore). 
 148. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 149. Id. at 984. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 982 (“Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory 
gaps.”). 
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it poses the risk over time of restricting agency discretion to take 
actions. As courts render more interpretations, those interpretations 
will limit the ability of agencies to adopt different interpretations of 
statutes to justify their actions.152 
These interpretations would be inevitable in suits that do not 
challenge the agency’s action but nevertheless turn on a statute that 
the agency administers. Remedial Chevron does not apply in those 
suits.153 But in suits challenging agency actions as unlawful, courts 
would have no need to render those interpretations. In such a suit, a 
court would first consider if the statute is unambiguous. If it is, the 
court would vacate the agency action if the agency’s interpretation is 
inconsistent with that unambiguous meaning. But if the court 
concludes that the statute is ambiguous, the court would assess 
whether the interpretation of the statute was reasonable. That 
assessment does not require the court to settle the meaning of the 
statute through its own interpretation. Instead, as under the current 
Chevron doctrine, the court must determine only whether the 
agency’s interpretation falls within the range of permissible 
interpretations.154 
To be sure, although courts need not provide their own 
interpretations, they could choose to do so. Such an interpretation 
could remove ambiguity from a statute and accordingly provide a 
basis for vacating an otherwise reasonable agency interpretation 
because of the rule against prospective-only application.155 But 
separation of powers considerations suggest that courts should 
generally avoid unnecessarily resolving the meaning of ambiguous 
statutes that agencies administer.156 Congress regularly confers broad 
 
 152. See id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how statutory ambiguities 
“resolved finally, conclusively, and forever, by federal judges” produce an ossification of 
statutory law). 
 153. To avoid limiting agencies’ interpretive options, courts in these suits could adopt a 
doctrine akin to constitutional avoidance: if a case involving a statute that an agency 
administers could be decided on another ground, the court should decide the case on that 
other ground. 
 154. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 651 (2015) (explaining that when a court determines whether an interpretation 
of a law is reasonable, it does not settle the meaning of law). 
 155. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 216 (1995) (“A judicial construction 
of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after 
the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.” (quoting Rivers v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994))). 
 156. Some judges might be inclined to interpret ambiguous statutes because they 
believe that agencies have too much power and judicial interpretations help constrain that 
power. Cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating constraining agency 
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discretion on agencies so that they have the flexibility to adopt 
effective policies. The breadth of authority derives not only from 
expansive terms in statutes directed at agencies but also from 
ambiguity in statutory terms. Unnecessary judicial interpretations of 
these ambiguous terms thus can impair an agency’s ability to carry out 
its duties.157 
These considerations do not apply to agency interpretations of 
statutes that agencies are not charged with administering (such as the 
APA). Those statutes are not designed to confer policy discretion on 
the agencies. Accordingly, there is less reason for courts to avoid 
interpreting those statutes, though they still could choose to assess 
only the reasonableness of agency interpretations of those statutes if 
doing so made sense. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Remedial Chevron, courts would no longer defer to 
agencies’ interpretations of statutes that they administer. Remedial 
Chevron would instead limit the ability of courts to provide the 
remedy of vacating agency action. In a challenge to an agency action 
alleging that the action rests on an erroneous interpretation of the 
law, a court could vacate the agency action only if the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute was unreasonable. 
Refashioning Chevron in this way would capture the institutional 
reasons for Chevron deference, while also avoiding the objections 
that Chevron deference violates Article III and the nondelegation 
doctrine and depends on a fiction. It would also create less tension 
with the APA, obviate difficult Chevron step zero questions, and 
draw a clear line between Chevron and Skidmore. 
 
power). But it is possible that the concerns of those judges might be allayed by the 
reduction of agency power under Remedial Chevron compared to the current Chevron 
doctrine. 
 157. This argument finds support in the Court’s approach to qualified immunity. 
Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity depends on two questions that closely 
track the inquiry under Remedial Chevron: first, whether the officer violated the law; and 
second, whether the officer’s actions were clearly prohibited by law. Although the Court 
once held that courts must answer the first question before addressing the second, Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), it has dispensed with that obligatory order of operations, 
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011). It now has adopted the opposite 
presumption, stressing that courts should “think hard, and then think hard again” before 
unnecessarily addressing the merits of a constitutional claim because resolving whether a 
right is clearly established has less consequence than resolving a constitutional issue. Id. 
